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An Asymmetrical Approach to the 
Problem of Peremptories? 
By Richard D. Friedman* 
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, and the 
extension of Batson to parties other than prosecutors, may be 
expected to put pressure on the institution of peremptory challenges. 
After a brief review of the history of peremptories, this article 
contends that peremptories for criminal defendants serve important 
values of our criminal justice system. It then argues that peremptories 
for prosecutors are not as important, and that it may no longer be 
worthwhile to maintain them in light of the administrative complexi-
ties inevitable in a system of peremptories consistent with Batson. 
The article concludes that the asymmetry of allowing peremptories 
for the accused but not for the prosecution is not troublesome. 
In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, 1 the Supreme Court hel<l 
that the Constitution forbids a criminal prosecutor to exercise 
peremptory challenges to potential jurors in a racially discrimina-
tory manner. Batson raised a host of important issues. Most 
obvious, perhaps, was the question of whether the prohibition of 
Batson would be extended to litigating parties other than a 
criminal prosecutor. In its last two terms, the Court has answered 
that queston resoundingly. Last year, in Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co. ,2 the Court extended Batson to civil litigants. And 
this year, the Court completed the circle, holding in Georgia 
v. McCollum3 that neither may criminal defendants exercise 
peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner. 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Tom 
Ferries for excellent research assistance, and to my colleagues Tom Green, Jerry 
Israel, Yale Kamisar, Rick Lempert, and Debra Livingston for valuable advice and 
comments. Because of editorial policy, masculine pronouns are used throughout 
this article. 
I 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
2 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). 
3 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
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Thus, the question of who is bound by Batson has been 
resolved, or at least nearly so,4 in a couple of broad brushstrokes. 
But other problems and complexities remain, and they are sure 
to put pressure on the continued maintenance of the institution 
of peremptory challenges itself. Indeed, in McCollum Justice 
Thomas, concurring, predicted dolefully that the death of per-
emptories was inevitable. 5 To many, though, that would be a 
welcome development. Concurring in Batson, Justice Thomas's 
predecessor, Justice Marshall, advocated the abolition of per-
emptories.6 And recently, three judges of the New York Court 
of Appeals-one shy of a majority on the highest court in the 
state-endorsed the same idea. 7 
This essay presents another, somewhat more moderate possi-
bility, which may at first sound slightly odd, although in fact it 
has deep historical roots: retention of the accused's peremptories 
but elimination of the prosecution's. 
The Historical Perspective 
Although peremptory challenges in civil cases appear to be a 
relatively recent creation, 8 in criminal cases they are very old. 
• The caveat reflects the suggestion made by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 
Inc., as amicus in McCollum, that different considerations apply when the peremptor-
ies are exercised by an accused who is a member of a racial minority. Justice 
Thomas referred somewhat sneeringly to this suggestion. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 n. 2. 
Although McCollum was based on the rights of the juror rather than on those of the 
accused, it seems unlikely that the Court would openly adopt different rules for 
defendants-or, for that matter jurors- of different races. Of course, application of 
McCollum will vary from one case to another, and it is impossible to be confident 
that the race of the accused will not be a significant factor. 
s 112 S. Ct. at 2360. 
6 476 U.S. at 103. 
7 People v. Bolling, 79 N. Y.2d 317, 591 N.E.2d 1136 (1992). See also Alschuler, 
"The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the 
Review of Jury Verdicts," 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 170 (1989) ("Even when 
exercised on grounds other than race, these challenges are unconstitutional"); 
Hastie, "Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection 
of Impartial Juries?,'' 40 American U. L. Rev. 703, 726 (''Jury selection procedures 
should . . . reduce or eliminate the institution of peremptory challenges."); 
Steinberg, ''The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Challenges,'' 27 Crim. L. Bull. 
216 (1991); Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction 
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of 
Equal Protection)," 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1026 (1987); Gurney, Note, "The Case for 
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials," 231 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 227 (1986). 
8 Blackstone speaks of peremptories only in criminal cases. 4 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England* 353. 
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The common law was generous in its provision of peremptories 
to criminal defendants, allowing them 35, later reduced (except 
in cases of high treason) to 20. The allowance of peremptory 
challenges was extolled by Blackstone in Commentaries on the 
Laws of England as "a provision full of that tenderness and 
humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly 
famous. " 9 But by a statute of 1305, enacted to correct a bias 
toward the prosecution in the selection of jurors, peremptory 
challenges were denied to the king' s attorneys. 10 This prohibition 
was only marginally effective, because prosecutors were allowed 
to require a member of the venire to "stand aside," giving a 
reason only if a jury of twelve could not be selected. 11 The 
"standing aside" procedure did not, however, find quick or 
universal acceptance in the United States. This resistance appears 
to be attributable to the same perception that led to the constitu-
tionalization of the jury right-the perception of the jury as an 
essential bulwark against state oppression. Thus, New York did 
not allow prosecutors any form of peremptory challenge until 
1881 and Virginiadidnotunti11919Yin 1856, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held, pursuant to statute, that federal courts should follow 
the procedure of the state in which they sat with respect to 
prosecutors' peremptories. 13 But through the nineteenth century, 
as the mistrust of government characteristic of the Revolutionary 
era gave way to increasing acceptance of state power, peremptor-
ies for the prosecution gradually became the rule rather than the 
exception. 14 
Even today, prosecutors are not always given the same 
number of peremptories as the accused. Under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 24(b), for example, in noncapital felony 
cases the accused is given ten peremptories and the government 
only six. And statutes in seventeen states provide more per-
emptories to the accused than to the prosecution in at least 
9Jd. 
10 Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. I, st. 4 (1305). 
11 Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Represen-
tative Panels 148 (1977). 
12 /d. at 148-149 & n. 46. 
13 United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856). 
14 Van Dyke, note 11 supra at 150. 
509 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
some criminal prosecutions. 15 Local practices may add more 
asymmetries. 
Peremptories for the Accused: "Tenderness and 
Humanity,'' Efficiency, and the Perception of Fairness 
The historical background suggests that, although peremptor-
ies now are provided to both sides in civil and criminal litigation, 
they exist principally for the benefit of criminal defendants. 
The value of the accused's peremptories may be assessed by 
comparing the status quo with the situation that would prevail if 
they did not exist. Presumably more liberal granting of challenges 
for cause would take up some of the slack caused by elimination 
of the accused's peremptories. Nevertheless, for several reasons 
it is far preferable to retain the accused's peremptories. 
Perhaps most obviously, even if the standard for a cause 
challenge is lowered, a biased juror will very often escape it. 
Largely for this reason, Justice Thomas, although concurring in 
McCollum, purportedly on the ground of stare decisis, expressed 
grave misgivings: 
I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this 
court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination 
of peremptory strikes .... Today's decision, while protecting jurors, 
leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves. Unless 
jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally 
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the 
verdict. 16 
Indeed, in some cases, an accused may reasonably conclude on 
the basis of one or more aspects of a potential juror's background 
or attitudes that he is less likely than the potential juror next in 
line to find in favor of the accused. Such a probabilistic judgment 
is an appropriate basis on which to exercise a peremptory 
challenge, and it will weed out some biased jurors. In most cases, 
though, it cannot support a challenge for cause, 17 unless the 
15 Ginger, 1 Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal Trials 173 ( 1984 & 1992 suppl.). 
16 112 S. Ct. at 2360. 
'
7 See Lempert, "Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge: Testimony on Jury 
Reform,'' 22 Law Quadrangle Notes No. 2, 8, 12 (Winter 1978) (''almost insoluble 
difficulties for a system which relies on the challenge for cause" posed "where a 
suspicion of bias is engendered not by some specific prejudice, but rather by a set of 
diffuse attitudes that characterize the juror's outlook on life."). 
510 
THE PROBLEM OF PEREMPTORIES 
standard for a cause challenge is eased so much as to sap it of 
virtually all meaning. 18 
The point should not be overstated: It is probably relatively 
rare that the availability of peremptories actually prevents an 
inaccurate verdict. Empirical research suggests that attorneys, 
despite extensive efforts, and even aided by ''scientific'' selection 
methods, actually tend in most cases to have only modest success 
in identifying jurors inclined to find adversely. 19 And even where 
the attorney is able to identify hostile jurors, in most cases it is 
unlikely that the use of peremptories will prevent an inaccurate 
verdict. 20 
But, even if peremptories are of only occasional importance 
in contributing to fairness itself, they are of consistent, although 
not as dramatic, importance in contributing to the perception of 
fairness. No system of challenges for cause can serve as well as 
peremptories the crucial function of giving the accused a strong 
sense that his jury is fair. 21 The accused may be suspicious of a 
juror ''even without being able to assign a reason.' ' 22 Or perhaps 
the accused knows the reason but is not able to persuade the 
18 The author's colleague, Professor Richard Lempert, has suggested that trial 
judges may tend to be overly hostile, rather than overly receptive, to cause challenges 
made by an accused. To the extent this is so, it would be another important reason 
for not relying solely on a system of cause challenges to protect the accused in jury 
selection, even though the elimination of peremptories would naturally tend to cause 
some liberalization in the grant of cause challenges. 
19 See Hastie, note 7 supra at 717-719 ("attorneys, relying on their experience 
and intuition, are not very acute judges of juror bias" but "do exercise a small 
influence on the outcome of a few cases; ' ' ''the party employing 'scientific' selection 
methods yields slightly better results than the side using conventional, intuition-
based voir dire or random selection"). 
20 A peremptory does not prevent the inclusion of a biased juror unless the 
attorney identifies the juror as relatively hostile and a challenge for cause fails (or 
would fail if made). And even if in a given case the exercise of peremptories does 
prevent the inclusion of one or more biased jurors, it still may be unlikely that denial 
of peremptories would lead to an inaccurate result; at least where jury unanimity is 
required, the inclusion of one or a few biased jurors is probably more likely to cause 
a hung jury than to transform an accurate verdict into an inaccurate one. 
21 See Hastie note 7 supra, at 725 ("social science research on procedural justice 
strongly implies that increased involvement of the defense attorney would be 
associated with a greater impression of fairness in the defendant's mind") (citation 
omitted); Barbara Allen Babcock, "Voir Dire: Preserving Its 'Wonderful Power' ", 
27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 552 (1975) (peremptories serve a didactic function, teaching 
the litigant and thus the community that the jury is a good model for deciding 
''because in a real sense the jury belongs to the litigant: he chooses it .... The ideal 
that the peremptory serves is that the jury not only should be fair and impartial, but 
should seem to be so to those whose fortunes are at issue."). 
22 Blackstone, note 8 supra, at 353. 
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judge that it amounts to good cause; it may be that the juror 
belongs to a group that the accused believes, as a statistical 
matter, is significantly less likely than the average run of jurors 
to find in his favor. 23 The value of peremptory challenges lies 
precisely in their peremptoriness-that the accused can remove 
a potential juror whom he suspects would be biased against him 
(or merely less likely to vote for acquittal than the next potential 
juror) without having to persuade anyone. Peremptories thus 
help remove even grounds of suspicion that are weak or that 
would be difficult or embarrassing to articulate. 24 
Given the nature of a criminal trial, in which the state attempts 
to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life), increasing 
not only the actuality of fairness but also the accused's perception 
of fairness is a crucial goal. 25 Punishment by the state is more 
easily justifiable when that perception is a strong one. This 
consideration is especially important when the accused is particu-
larly vulnerable to oppression by the state and prejudice by 
portions of the populace-and, as suggested by Justice Thomas 
in McCollum, that may be when peremptoties serve their most 
important purpose. 
The accused's peremptories have other, subsidiary bene-
fits as well. To develop a challenge for cause often requires ex-
tensive questioning of a juror, and as Blackstone pointed out, 
''the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes pro-
voke a resentment.' ' 26 The problem is inevitable, and making the 
23 See Pizzi, "Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient," 
1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 126 ("What really happens at the peremptory challenges 
stage is comparison shopping.''). 
24 The embarrassment is not only to the accused. For pre-Batson views, see 
Spears, Note, "Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the 
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1493, 1503 ("the judicial 
system lets the parties handle under the guise of silence and caprice what the courts 
themselves should not and perhaps cannot handle rationally"), and Babcock, note 
21 supra, at 553-554 (peremptories avoid the "societally divisive" need for 
''trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes''). 
25 Indeed, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to the extent that it 
applies to hearsay statements, is based in substantial part on this consideration. See 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018-1019 (1988); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,540 
(1986). The author of this article has described very briefly and roughly the 
principles that he believes should govern the hearsay aspect of the Confrontation 
Clause in ''Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay,'' 76 
Minn. L. Rev. 723, 726 n. 10 (1992). 
26 Lempert, note 17 supra, at 12-13, also argues that challenges for cause may 
be ''degrading or insulting'' to the challenged juror, whereas a peremptory challenge 
has the ''virtue of saving face.'' To the extent this is a problem with challenges for 
512 
THE PROBLEM OF PEREMPTORIES 
system more dependent on challenges for cause would aggravate 
it. 27 
Finally, in some cases peremptories offer efficiency benefits. 
Occasionally, the exercise of a peremptory may keep off the jury 
an outlier, someone who would not persuade his colleagues but 
who might through sheer stubbornness or conviction cause a 
hung jury. Moreover, challenges for cause are more expensive 
to administer than are peremptory challenges. Not only must 
groundwork be laid in questioning, but an argument must be 
made to the judge, who must rule, and if the ruling is against the 
accused an appeal is possible. Peremptories, by contrast, to the 
extent they are allowed to be truly peremptory, are about as simple 
to administer as could be. The importance of this consideration is 
mitigated, but not altogether eliminated, by the fact that, so long 
as the accused does not have a surplus of them, he has a strong 
incentive to develop a challenge for cause against a juror whom 
he wishes to exclude, thus saving one of his peremptories. 
Peremptories for the Prosecutor: Is the Game Worth the 
Candle? 
Prosecutors' peremptories stand on weaker ground than do 
the accused's. Indeed, as the historical background has indicated, 
during much of the last 700 years or so, peremptories have 
not been as firmly established for prosecutors as for criminal 
defendants. There is good reason for this: The crucial function 
of increasing the accused's perception of fairness is not served 
by prosecutors' peremptories. Indeed, that function will be 
disserved to the extent that the prosecutor uses his peremptories 
to exclude jurors who, although apparently fair-minded, have 
backgrounds and attitudes suggesting that they are more likely 
than the average member of the community to find in favor of 
the accused. 
Batson has mitigated, although hardly eliminated, one serious 
aspect of this problem, the tendency for prosecutors to use 
peremptories discriminatorily against potential jurors from mi-
cause, it might be mitigated, but not eliminated, by attempting to prevent the juror 
from learning why he was excluded and at whose instance. 
27 See Babcock, note 21 supra, at 552-553 (Because of potential alienation from 
questioning, ''[w]ithout the insurance of the peremptory challenge, a party would 
be far less able to search for cause to eliminate jurors.''). 
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nority ethnic groups. 28 At the same time, however, Batson has 
created a serious disadvantage of another type: It has made 
prosecutors' peremptories a frightfully expensive procedural 
nightmare. Batson has meant that very often-particularly where 
the accused is a member of a minority group, but even in some 
cases where he is not29-the prosecutor's exercise of peremptories 
threatens to append a minicase of discrimination onto the criminal 
trial. And the discrimination case is not so easily resolved. 
In some cases, the court must first determine whether the 
group assertedly excluded is cognizable under the Batson doc-
trine. If the prosecutor excludes blacks or Hispanics willy-nilly, 
that will run afoul of Batson, but presumably if he does the same 
to plumbers or pipefitters that will not. What if the prosecutor 
excludes people whose names sound Italian? The cases seem to 
be at odds. 3° Conflicts such as this one may be resolved in time, 
but new ones are sure to arise as courts test the outer reaches of 
Batson. One court, for example, has applied Batson to disallow 
a peremptory challenge of a hearing-imparied juror. 3' 
If the court determines that the discrimination alleged is the 
type covered by Batson, it must then determine whether a prima 
28 See Brown, McGuire, & Winters, "The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipula-
tive Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse," 14 New Eng. L. Rev. 
192, 234 (1978) (proposing, before Batson, that prosecutors' peremptories be 
eliminated "[u]nless and until courts are equipped with effective means for interven-
ing against discriminatory uses of the peremptory challenge."). 
29 See Powers v. Ohio, IllS. Ct. 1364 (1991) (murder trial, white victim, white 
accused; held, 7-2, that accused has standing to object to prosecutor's use of 
peremptories to exclude black jurors). 
30 See Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Two Years Later, 24 Tulsa L.J. 63, 80-81 
(1988); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1063 (1988) (not cognizable); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833-834 (1st 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988) (defendants failed to show that Italians 
are a cognizable racial group and that veniremen whose names ended in vowels 
necessarily were Italian); United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89,95-96 (2d Cir. 1988), 
certdenied, 489 U.S. 1052 (noting, without ruling on, trial court's characterization of 
Italian-Americans as a cognizable racial group, and finding no abuse of discretion 
in denial of new trial because the prosecutor offered reasonable neutral explanations, 
e.g., that panel members or their spouses held positions that might enable them to 
identify one of the defendants). 
31 People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester Co. Ct. 
1990). 
The possibilities are seemingly endless. Suppose the prosecution in a rape trial 
challenges young men. Is that covered? There appear to be no published cases as 
yet, but no doubt there will be. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 409 Mass. 689, 568 
N.E.2d 1158 (1991) (trial judge committed reversible error in not allowing rape 
defendant, who had not challenged older women, to exercise peremptories against 
three young women). 
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facie case of discrimination is made out. According to the 
New York Court of Appeals, "[t]here are no fixed rules" for 
answering this question; the statistics of whom the prosecutor 
challenges and whom he accepts are helpful, but not conclusive, 
especially when the accused's objection is to a single peremptory 
challenge. Such factors as "objective facts indicating that the 
prosecutor has challenged members of a particular racial group 
who might be expected to favor the prosecution because of their 
backgrounds'' must also be taken into account. 32 
If the court does find a prima facie case of discrimination, 
the sideshow is not over, because the prosecutor has the opportu-
nity to demonstrate that the exercise of peremptories was done 
of a permissible basis. Suppose that the accused is Hispanic, and 
that much of the testimony will be in Spanish. Can the prosecutor 
defend peremptory challenges of Spanish-speaking jurors by 
expressing fear that they will follow their own understanding of 
the testimony rather than the official translation? The Supreme 
Court has said yes. 33 It is difficult to know which this puts in the 
most unfavorable light -the judicial exaltation of the translation 
over the actual testimony, the Batson rule, or peremptories 
themselves. 34 
32 People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 323-324, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (1992). 
There is a slightly bizarre aspect to this consideration, although it may be inevitable 
given Batson. In exercising peremptories, the prosecutor is not only allowed, but 
expected, to adhere to generalizations based on the background of a potential 
juror, but the prosecutor must disregard one crucial facet of the potential juror's 
background, his race, that may have affected that juror's life and perspective more 
strongly than any, or nearly any, other. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-504 
(1972) (pre-Batson case, upholding standing of white man to challenge jury selection 
system that effectively excluded blacks; '' [W]hen any large and identifiable segment 
of the community is excluded from jury service, [the] exclusion deprives the jury of 
a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case 
that may be presented."). 
33 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). Justice Kennedy's opinion 
for a four-justice plurality did make a suggestion for the future. He said that: 
though petitioner did not suggest the alternative to the trial court here, Spanish-
speaking jurors could be permitted to advise the judge in a discreet way of any 
concerns with the translation during the course of trial. A prosecutor's persistence 
in the desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors despite this measure could be 
taken into account in determining whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for 
the challenge. 
111 S. Ct. at 1868. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in part 
on the basis that this remedy could have been adopted by the trial judge in 
Hernandez's case. 
3
• See generally Alschuler, note 7 supra, at 173-176 (noting the flimsy explana-
tions that have been held sufficient rebuttal of prima facie discrimination). 
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If the court does find a Batson violation, it must grant an 
appropriate remedy; sometimes it may be feasible for the court 
to order the seating of jurors who had previously been excused, 35 
but sometimes it is necessary to dismiss the entire panel and start 
anew. 36 
Finally, if in the end the trial court decides there is no Batson 
violation, the accused may appeal on that issue. Unless the appeal 
is interlocutory-which requires a postponement of trial-the 
only effective remedy, if the appellate court determines that there 
has been a violation, is a retrial. 37 
Small wonder that, as Professor William Pizzi has said: '' [i]f 
one wanted to understand how the American trial system for 
criminal cases came to be the most expensive and time-consuming 
in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point 
than Batson. " 38 
These complexities are probably inevitable in a system that 
gives the prosecution peremptory challenges subject to the quali-
fication that a limited set of grounds for their exercise is imper-
missible.39 The qualification could be removed only if Batson 
35 See People v. Green, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 1992). 
36 People v. Granillo, 197 Cal. App. 3d 110, 242 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 5th 
Dist. 1987). 
37 E.g., People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452 
(1987). 
38 Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 155. 
39 Given McCollum, some of these complexities may arise as well with respect to 
the accused's peremptories, but less frequently. A quick scan of reported decisions 
at the trial level indicates that the vast majority of Batson-type motions are made 
against prosecutors' peremptories. This may be in part because the prosecutor is 
less likely than the accused to be motivated to complicate the case by making the 
objection. It is also possible that the accused is less likely than the prosecutor to 
exercise peremptories on racially discriminatory grounds. Experiments show that 
in-group favoritism tends to be stronger when a group sees itself as a minority. 
Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 13. This suggests that a prosecutor trying a case against an 
accused who is a member of a minority group has a great deal to gain by exercising 
peremptories in a discriminatory manner against members of that group, and that 
(except in a racially charged case) a white accused has relatively little to gain by 
discriminatory peremptories. As for a minority-member accused, the exercise of 
peremptories on racially discriminatory grounds against whites is likely to be futile; 
in most communities, a substantial number of jurors next in line are likely to be 
white. 
Furthermore, it is probable that most often when a trial court denies a McCollum 
objection, the prosecutor will not emulate the prosecutor in McCollum itself by 
seeking an interlocutory appeal, and that will mean that the matter will end at the 
trial court level. 
In short, it is doubtful whether McCollum will create the administrative snarl that 
Batson itself did. And, although only time will tell, the complications caused by the 
extension of Batson to civil cases will probably not be intolerable. 
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were overruled. That prospect, however, is both unappealing 
and extremely unlikely. The question then becomes whether the 
supposed benefits of prosecutors' peremptories are great enough 
to make the considerable costs worthwhile; Batson has so funda-
mentally altered the nature of prosecutors' peremptories that 
inertia alone should not justify their retention. 
Prosecutors' peremptories do presumably occasionally pre-
vent inaccurate verdicts, but for reasons discussed previously 
this is probably a relatively rare occurrence. 40 Prosecutors' per-
emptories also offer some benefits comparable to the subsidiary 
benefits of the accused's peremptories. But these do not seem 
weighty enough to warrant retaining them. 41 And neither is any 
concern about altering the balance of litigation. 
Putting It Together: The Nonproblem of Asymmetry 
So far this article has argued that it is important to preserve 
peremptories for the accused and suggested that it may be wise 
to eliminate them for the prosecutor. Putting these ideas together 
is sure to raise objections of asymmetry, 42 but these objections 
should not be troublesome. 
For one thing, the allocation of peremptories is already 
asymmetrical in federal courts and in a substantial number of 
states. Eliminating peremptories for the prosecution altogether 
would expand and accentuate an already existing asymmetry, not 
create a new one. 
40 See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text. 
41 One of the subsidiary benefits of peremptories discussed supra notes 26-27 
and accompanying and following text, is that they minimize the adverse consequences 
of questioning a potential juror aggressively. Juror resentment is far less worrisome 
when the target is the prosecution rather than the accused. 
Another subsidiary benefit of peremptories is avoidance of hung juries. Elimina-
tion of prosecutors' peremptories may produce more hung juries in cases that 
otherwise would, and should, yield convictions. That would be unfortunate. But at 
least the case could be retried. It is hard to believe that the inefficiencies caused by 
additional hung juries would approach in magnitude those caused by prosecutors' 
peremptories under Batson. And most criminal defendants would gladly accept an 
increased chance of having to be tried twice in exchange for elimination of 
prosecutors' peremptories. 
Finally, while peremptories for the accused may be somewhat more efficient to 
administer than challenges for cause, this consideration, which is marginal only (see 
text following note 27 supra) applies only ifperemptories are kept simple-and that, 
of course, Batson does not allow. 
42 See, e.g., Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 147 ("The immediate result of abolishing 
peremptory challenges for prosecutors only would be to remove the adversary 
balance that presently exists in the jury selection process."). 
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More fundamentally, it is important to bear in mind that 
criminal trials are not about even-handedness.43 In various ways, 
the judicial system creates asymmetries to protect important 
rights of the accused. Most obviously, the accused is presumed 
innocent and only proof beyond a reasonable doubt will suffice 
to convict; if, after all the evidence is in, the jury is in equipoise, 
or even thinks that guilt is substantially, but not overwhelmingly, 
probable, it must return a verdict of not guilty. Other asymmetries 
can also be crucial. The prosecution is obligated to disclose 
potentially exculpatory evidence to the accused, 44 but the accused 
has no obligation to disclose inculpatory evidence to the prosecu-
tion. The accused can decide to testify, but the prosecution cannot 
compel him to. The accused can put his character into issue, to 
show that he was not a person likely to commit the crime charged, 
but unless he does so the prosecution cannot attempt to show that 
he was such a person. 4s Similarly, in certain cases, only the 
accused can decide whether to raise questions about the character 
of the purported victim, such as by bolstering a contention of 
self-defense by showing that the supposed victim is a violent 
person.46 And in some circumstances the accused's right to 
confront witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution gives him the right to override an evidentiary 
objection of the type that would bind the prosecution. 47 
As compared to a symmetrical rule, each of these asymmetries 
alters the results of the factfinding process in favor of the 
accused. To a large extent, though, that is desirable. Blackstone's 
statement that it is better to let ten guilty defendants go free than 
to convict one innocent person may be a cliche , but it only 
became a cliche because it expresses a fundamental value. The 
principal expression of that value in our criminal law system is 
43 But note Justice Marshall's dissent in Batson, 476 U.S. at 79: "Our criminal 
justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but 
also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales 
are to be evenly held.' Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)." Justice 
Marshall's reliance on Hayes is criticized in Goldwasser, Note, ''Limiting a Criminal 
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal 
Trial," 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808. 821-826 (1989), which makes an argument similar 
to the one presented in this paragraph of the text. 
44 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
•s Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). 
46 Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2). 
47 Davis v. Alaska, 474 U.S. 308 (1974). 
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the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which, as 
compared to a more-likely-than-not standard, prevents some 
fact-finding errors against the accused at the price of creating far 
more fact-finding errors in favor of the accused-a trade-off that 
is easily worthwhile. 
Thus, even if an asymmetrical rule on peremptories led to a 
substantially greater number of errors in favor of the accused as 
compared to those that would be yielded by a symmetrical rule 
(either both sides or neither side having peremptories), that 
would not be enough to condemn the asymmetrical rule. We 
would first have to ask whether the corresponding reduction in 
errors against the accused is great enough to make the change a 
net improvement in the truth-determining process, given that 
errors against the accused are far more important that errors in 
favor of the accused. There is no way of knowing for sure, but it 
seems unlikely that the increase in errors in favor of the accused 
would be so many times greater than the increase in errors against 
the accused to make the trade-off a bad one. 48 
Moreover, even if the ratio of these two effects does work to 
the disadvantage of the asymmetrical rule, it is unlikely that the 
magnitude of the increase in errors in favor of the accused would 
be so great as to be not only a significant concern, but to outweigh 
in importance the efficiency of denying peremptories to the 
prosecution or the perceived value of maintaining them for the 
accused.49 
A Rumination 
There is a strong case for maintaining peremptories for the 
accused. Perhaps the case can be made for retaining prosecutors' 
48 Actually, two comparisons are necessary, because there are two basic symmetri-
cal rules. As compared to a rule allowing neither side peremptories, the reduction 
in errors against the accused caused by the asymmetrical rule would probably be 
greater than the increase in errors in favor of the accused; this is because, as 
compared to the no-peremptory rule, the asymmetrical rule essentially results in the 
replacement of some jurors who may have a bias against the accused with jurors 
who are presumably fair. For corresponding reasons, as compared to the results 
under the usual practice allowing either side peremptories, the increase in errors in 
favor of the accused under the asymmetrical rule would probably be greater than 
the decrease in errors against the accused, but one could not say with any confidence 
that the ratio of these two effects works to the disadvantage of the asymmetrical 
rule. 
49 See supra notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text for reasons suggesting 
that the magnitude of the increase in errors attributable to the elimination of 
peremptories would not be great. 
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peremptories, but this is doubtful, and it does not seem that the 
case can be made on the ground of symmetry. So this presents 
the possibility of an asymmetrical solution, in which the accused 
but not the prosecutor may challenge potential jurors perempto-
rily. That leads one to wonder whether McCollum would have 
come out the way it had if there were no prosecutors' peremptor-
ies. Would the Court have been tempted to limit the accused's 
exercise of his peremptories? The best guess-and it can only be 
that-is that the Court would have let the accused's peremptories 
remain truly peremptory. 
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